In a forum held in Beijing on world trade, the audience was interested in the current Sino-US trade disputes. One of them raised his hand and asked a Japanese panelist, a bureaucrat from the Ministry of International Trade, “any advice from the Japanese experience?” The panelist answered, “talking”. 

Another female audience member raised her hand and asked him “how about if they don’t listen to you?” He again answered “talking”, adding that Japan has spent two decades talking with the United States through public and private channels.

And he mentioned the current trends of bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements as more opportunities for talking. Apparently she seemed not be satisfied with his explanation.

If something is missing in this discussion, it should be a political perspective such as what incentives a constituency-elected leader can prioritize and how policy making works and which actors are involved in that process.

Answers to the questions in the forum could emerge from how Japan painstakingly got through the negotiations over the understandings of this political landscape in the US. If they do not listen to your voice, you have to make them listen to you.

It is not necessary you directly lobby other governments to approve your statement, but it is sometimes more effective to influence them indirectly through their constituencies.

Japan’s prolonged struggles with the US on trade were along such lines. Japan’s trade surplus with the US pressured US administrations to adjust the trade imbalance between the two countries. That pressure lasted for two decades, the 1970s and 1980s, by engulfing relevant industries: textile, steel, electronics, semiconductor, automobile and agricultural products.

As shocking images of the smashing of Japanese products by US citizens and congressman filled the Japanese with dread, the US domestic anti-Japanese public opinion was much harsher than the current response to China.

Backed up by the fiery wind of public opinion, the US pressure escalated into interference in domestic affairs such as import quotas on the Japanese market and structural reform of the country itself.

Under this pressure, Japan has been filling in the trade gaps. To cut a surplus of textile production capacity in 1970s, Japanese administrations gave large compensation to domestic manufacturers.

Japan also carried out currency revaluations and voluntary export restraint, especially in electronics or automobiles. In addition, major exporting industries in Japan had moved to avert a crisis of trade war by active localization.

On the other hand Japan struggled to increase its US imports. It lowered customs and revised domestic rules on government procurements, certification criterion and large-scale retail store restrictions.

They resulted in easier access to import goods for Japanese consumers. Now many US big stores have established themselves in Japan. Foreign pressure made the Japanese market transparent and local and international companies compete against each other on equal conditions.

In the democratic countries especially, domestic constituencies are key factors for international trade policy. Advice from Japan’s bittersweet experience would be for China to recognize and influence them.

If the people left behind by growth as depicted in “Hillbilly Elegy” helped bring about the current president, these people, in addition to traditional constituencies for republicans, also deserve special attention also from trade partners. In addition, it is worth noting that the US president is not the only actor other countries have to consider.

Congressmen can exercise more destructive political power by legislative authority. These leaders are more concerned about their local benefits sometimes more than ambiguous national interest.

These processes to influence the US could be demanding and not easy to comprehend for China. But it is obvious they are more effective and productive than just talking.

Masanari Koike is a visiting fellow at Tsinghua University, and former member of the House of Representatives, Japan.The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

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