The situation on the Korean Peninsula in 2018 and its outlook
By Zou Zhibo |
Updated: 2019-01-08 17:33
Zou Zhibo
Since the start of 2018, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has undergone a huge transition -- the most transformative since the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue arose in 1992. This happened thanks to a major policy adjustment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The policy change was implied in the 2018 New Year address of the top leader Kim Jong-Un, explicitly demonstrated in DPRK's interactions with the Republic of Korea during the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in February, and eventually confirmed at the third Plenary Session of the seventh Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea held on Apr 20, 2018. In this conference, the national line was changed from developing economy and nuclear force simultaneously to sparing no efforts on economic construction.
The DPRK froze the nuclear tests on its own initiative, including discontinuing nuclear tests and the test firing of intercontinental ballistic rockets, pledging to abandon a missile engine test ground and launching stand at Sohae Satellite and Missile Launching Station, and taking extra steps to abandon the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. These moves have shown DPRK's resolve to cease nuclear and missile weapon development. Meanwhile, DPRK officials have also approached China and Russia to improve relations.
From the external perspective, the PyeongChang Winter Olympics offered an opportunity for DPRK and ROK to ease their relations. High-level exchanges were resumed and the Panmunjom Declaration was signed during the first inter-Korean summit after several rounds of communication. The second inter-Korean visit was held shortly after the first one, and ROK President Moon Jae-in paid his first visit to DPRK, signing the Pyongyang Joint Declaration in September. Consensus has also been reached between the two sides on Kim Jong-Un's visit to South Korea. The two have conducted extensive interactions and pragmatic cooperation in military, sports, culture, economy and trade in 2018, bring about continued improvement in the situation on the peninsula.
On June 12, 2018, top leaders of the United States and DPRK held a historic meeting, and issued a joint statement. Within this framework, the two sides pledged to build a new type of relationship between the US and the DPRK relations and establish a longer-term stable peace mechanism; DPRK promised to realize the target of denuclearization. However, due to huge divergences on key issues including the mode and details of denuclearization, the following working meeting achieved no substantial progress. The two sides decided to hold a second summit next year, hoping to carry out the consensus and achieved real results.
Divergences on “denuclearization”
Denuclearization refers to renouncing the possession and development of nuclear weapons. In this regard, a country engaged in a denuclearization process is dismantling or transferring all its nuclear warheads, components for nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials, discontinuing research institutes for nuclear weapons, and demolishing or destroying facilities for nuclear weapons production and tests.
In reality, the connotation of denuclearization was expanded, generating two variant concepts. One is "extended denuclearization", which adds uranium enrichment and reprocess into the definition. The other is "all-around denuclearization", which also development of the launching vehicle -- ballistic missiles -- as well as chemical and biological weapons. These two concepts go well beyond the traditional definition of denuclearization.
The United States is insisting on a package solution, pushing the DPRK to denuclearize once for all, and has suggested the “model of Libya”. But the DPRK wants to take a step-by-step approach of phased and synchronized process, with the US responding to each denuclearization move steps of its own -- lifting sanctions, officially ending the Korean war, establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK and eventually establishing a lasting peace regime on the peninsula.
Meanwhile, the American CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization) proposal contains not only uranium enrichment and reprocess, but also ballistic missile and chemical and biological weapons, hence the term "all-around denuclearization".
Prospects
Regarding the root causes of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the current situation in the region, denuclearization is not likely to be achieved in the short run. The DPRK will not completely abandon its nuclear capability before it gets reliable safety guarantee, but a complete abandonment of nuclear weapons is the pre-condition required by the US before giving the DPRK that safety assurance. This poses a sharp contradiction.
On the other hand, if the DPRK meets the denuclearization target, reconciles with the ROK and establishes a lasting peace mechanism, the US-ROK military alliance and US military presence in Northeast Asia will become a problem. America's strategic dominance and control in Northeast Asia will also be in doubt. It's not likely that the United States could accept this prospect. The US negotiators’ persistence on the DPRK sanctions and warnings of the ROK's “overspeed” actions both testify to this intention.
Real settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issues will materialize only when the US cannot sustain its global strategic goals and has to withdraw from Northeast Asia. Of course, there is also the possibility that the DPRK could denuclearize on its own accord. The national policy shift in 2018 is not reversible, so a voluntary denuclearization is becoming more and more realistic and expected. This requires strong support from various parties -- surrounding countries in particular -- to give the DPRK a sense of fulfillment and gain in its policy change. In such an evolving landscape, the DPRK may choose to denuclearize on its own initiative.
Although denuclearization is not possible in the short run, the situation on the peninsula could well improve and maintain the current peace and stability. It’s possible not only because of the major national policy change of DPRK, but also the consensus and joint efforts of related counties, of which the role of ROK is critically important. As a stakeholder of the peninsula issue and a party of the US-ROK military alliance, the ROK can take active measures to adjust its relations with the DPRK, and contain military actions taken by the US and the ROK, thereby influencing the safety landscape on the peninsula.
Other countries in northeastern Asia also shoulder responsibility and duty in this regard: They should resolutely support the improvement of relations between the DPRK and the ROK, promote their own bilateral ties with the DPRK and encourage it towards a path of opening up and integrated to the world. They also need to push in the United Nations for easing sanctions on the DPRK, support its economic construction and include it into regional economic development in Northeast Asia.
Zou Zhibo is senior research fellow and vice-director of Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.
All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.
Zou Zhibo
Since the start of 2018, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has undergone a huge transition -- the most transformative since the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue arose in 1992. This happened thanks to a major policy adjustment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The policy change was implied in the 2018 New Year address of the top leader Kim Jong-Un, explicitly demonstrated in DPRK's interactions with the Republic of Korea during the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in February, and eventually confirmed at the third Plenary Session of the seventh Central Committee of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea held on Apr 20, 2018. In this conference, the national line was changed from developing economy and nuclear force simultaneously to sparing no efforts on economic construction.
The DPRK froze the nuclear tests on its own initiative, including discontinuing nuclear tests and the test firing of intercontinental ballistic rockets, pledging to abandon a missile engine test ground and launching stand at Sohae Satellite and Missile Launching Station, and taking extra steps to abandon the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. These moves have shown DPRK's resolve to cease nuclear and missile weapon development. Meanwhile, DPRK officials have also approached China and Russia to improve relations.
From the external perspective, the PyeongChang Winter Olympics offered an opportunity for DPRK and ROK to ease their relations. High-level exchanges were resumed and the Panmunjom Declaration was signed during the first inter-Korean summit after several rounds of communication. The second inter-Korean visit was held shortly after the first one, and ROK President Moon Jae-in paid his first visit to DPRK, signing the Pyongyang Joint Declaration in September. Consensus has also been reached between the two sides on Kim Jong-Un's visit to South Korea. The two have conducted extensive interactions and pragmatic cooperation in military, sports, culture, economy and trade in 2018, bring about continued improvement in the situation on the peninsula.
On June 12, 2018, top leaders of the United States and DPRK held a historic meeting, and issued a joint statement. Within this framework, the two sides pledged to build a new type of relationship between the US and the DPRK relations and establish a longer-term stable peace mechanism; DPRK promised to realize the target of denuclearization. However, due to huge divergences on key issues including the mode and details of denuclearization, the following working meeting achieved no substantial progress. The two sides decided to hold a second summit next year, hoping to carry out the consensus and achieved real results.
Divergences on “denuclearization”
Denuclearization refers to renouncing the possession and development of nuclear weapons. In this regard, a country engaged in a denuclearization process is dismantling or transferring all its nuclear warheads, components for nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials, discontinuing research institutes for nuclear weapons, and demolishing or destroying facilities for nuclear weapons production and tests.
In reality, the connotation of denuclearization was expanded, generating two variant concepts. One is "extended denuclearization", which adds uranium enrichment and reprocess into the definition. The other is "all-around denuclearization", which also development of the launching vehicle -- ballistic missiles -- as well as chemical and biological weapons. These two concepts go well beyond the traditional definition of denuclearization.
The United States is insisting on a package solution, pushing the DPRK to denuclearize once for all, and has suggested the “model of Libya”. But the DPRK wants to take a step-by-step approach of phased and synchronized process, with the US responding to each denuclearization move steps of its own -- lifting sanctions, officially ending the Korean war, establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK and eventually establishing a lasting peace regime on the peninsula.
Meanwhile, the American CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization) proposal contains not only uranium enrichment and reprocess, but also ballistic missile and chemical and biological weapons, hence the term "all-around denuclearization".
Prospects
Regarding the root causes of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the current situation in the region, denuclearization is not likely to be achieved in the short run. The DPRK will not completely abandon its nuclear capability before it gets reliable safety guarantee, but a complete abandonment of nuclear weapons is the pre-condition required by the US before giving the DPRK that safety assurance. This poses a sharp contradiction.
On the other hand, if the DPRK meets the denuclearization target, reconciles with the ROK and establishes a lasting peace mechanism, the US-ROK military alliance and US military presence in Northeast Asia will become a problem. America's strategic dominance and control in Northeast Asia will also be in doubt. It's not likely that the United States could accept this prospect. The US negotiators’ persistence on the DPRK sanctions and warnings of the ROK's “overspeed” actions both testify to this intention.
Real settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issues will materialize only when the US cannot sustain its global strategic goals and has to withdraw from Northeast Asia. Of course, there is also the possibility that the DPRK could denuclearize on its own accord. The national policy shift in 2018 is not reversible, so a voluntary denuclearization is becoming more and more realistic and expected. This requires strong support from various parties -- surrounding countries in particular -- to give the DPRK a sense of fulfillment and gain in its policy change. In such an evolving landscape, the DPRK may choose to denuclearize on its own initiative.
Although denuclearization is not possible in the short run, the situation on the peninsula could well improve and maintain the current peace and stability. It’s possible not only because of the major national policy change of DPRK, but also the consensus and joint efforts of related counties, of which the role of ROK is critically important. As a stakeholder of the peninsula issue and a party of the US-ROK military alliance, the ROK can take active measures to adjust its relations with the DPRK, and contain military actions taken by the US and the ROK, thereby influencing the safety landscape on the peninsula.
Other countries in northeastern Asia also shoulder responsibility and duty in this regard: They should resolutely support the improvement of relations between the DPRK and the ROK, promote their own bilateral ties with the DPRK and encourage it towards a path of opening up and integrated to the world. They also need to push in the United Nations for easing sanctions on the DPRK, support its economic construction and include it into regional economic development in Northeast Asia.
Zou Zhibo is senior research fellow and vice-director of Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.
All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.
