The second meeting between leaders of the United States and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is scheduled to be held in Vietnamese capital of Hanoi over February 27-28, 2019. With the very first summit in Singapore still fresh in memory, people are wondering why the second one is coming so soon, what could be expected, and what influence will this meeting exert on the eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

On June 12, 2018, US President Donald Trump and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Un held a historic meeting in Singapore and issued a joint statement, pledging to build a new US-DPRK relationship and a long-term mechanism to realize peace and denuclearization on the peninsula. Later on, working-level negotiations were conducted at the instructions of the two leaders to implement the achievements of the first summit. US Secretary of States and Special Representative for North Korea Policy met with their DPRK counterparts several times, but without substantial progress till now due to huge divergences on details and the mode of denuclearization.

In fact, DPRK’s substantial denuclearization actions were all taken before the first US-DPRK summit, including renouncing nuclear tests and the test firing of intercontinental ballistic rockets; dismantling the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and abandoning a missile engine test ground and launching stand at Sohae Satellite and Missile Launching Station.

After the June 2018 meeting, however, due to unsuccessful working-level meetings, DPRK did not take further denuclearization actions after the first summit, which fell far short of Trump and Kim Jong-Un's expectations.

What's worse, tensions arose here and there between US and DPRK after the first summit over issues like military exercises, sanctions and inter-Korean relations. In the January 2019 Missile Defense Review issued by the Pentagon, DPRK “continues to pose an extraordinary threat”, which means that no progress has been secured either in denuclearization or US-DPRK relations.

In such context, the goal of the second summit is to push forward the denuclearization process from a bigger picture.

Meanwhile, the two leaders will promote denuclearization based on political considerations.

If Trump is going to seek re-election next year, denuclearization will be one of his major political and diplomatic assets.

Since Kim has decided on a major national policy readjustment and is now focusing on economic development, he needs relaxed international sanctions, a loosened blockade and improved relations with the US, which are all to some extent dependent on tangible denuclearization progress. Therefore, political motivations are a major driver for the second summit.

Expected results

Judging from the roots of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and related law of disarmament, two phases of denuclearization on the peninsula are expected.

The first phase covers discontinuance of nuclear and missile weapons development across the board, i.e. halting quality improvement and quantity increase of nuclear and missile weapons (if DPRK agrees to include ballistic missiles in the denuclearization basket).

To meet this target, nuclear and missile test grounds should be shut down, related development activities stopped, and production of nuclear warheads and weapons-grade nuclear materials (weapons-grade uranium and plutonium) abandoned and missile factories closed.

The second phase involves reduction and destruction of nuclear warheads and carrying vehicles in order to achieve the goal of denuclearization.

With these caveats, denuclearization on the peninsula will be a long process, and by no means could it be done within a short period as Trump has wished for. The most realistic goal for the time being is to complete the tasks of the first phase.

Therefore the second US-DPRK summit is anticipated to make specific arrangements for discontinuing nuclear and missile tests, declaration of production facilities of uranium, plutonium, warheads and missiles by DPRK.

According to the principle of reciprocity, the US may sign agreement with the DPRK on formal truce, establish liaison offices in DPRK to promote bilateral relations, relax sanctions, re-provide humanitarian aid, restore the Kaesong industrial complex, resume tourism activities at Kumgang Mountain, etc.

Of course, Trump will also strive to make detailed arrangements for eventual denuclearization.

Influence on future denuclearization

Substantial denuclearization achievements could be well expected from the second summit, but the key lies in implementation.

Considering the policy readjustment of DPRK and the political demand of Trump, achievements of the second summit concerning the first phase of denuclearization will be carried out in twists and turns in the less than two years of Trump’s administration.

Whether expected targets could be met do not depend on DPRK , but on how Trump and the establishment handle the game.

The fate of future denuclearization will hinge on the re-election of Trump and DPRK-policy orientations of future US presidents from the technical perspective, and judgement of the US from the strategic perspective.

Zou Zhibo is senior research fellow and vice-director of Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

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