In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), representing the largest development initiative ever in recent years. The BRI comprises two large segments: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.

Since 2013, BRI has become the best-known but perhaps the least understood development initiative of our time. There is no agreed-upon definition for what qualifies as a BRI project. Currently, there are more than 65 countries participating in the BRI, making it probably the largest platform for international development.

Facility connectivity has been a central focus of the BRI. The ultimate goals are to promote peaceful cooperation and common development around the world, where all countries can participate. The initiative also hopes to promote an efficient flow of materials and integration of markets to achieve diversified, balanced, mutually beneficial and sustainable development.

Implementation of the BRI in recent years has generated widespread interest and some concerns. On the one hand, developing and emerging economies have a huge demand for infrastructure development to stimulate economic growth. On the other, there are also concerns about the environmental costs of infrastructure development, and about the financial burden that these infrastructure investments may add to the already challenging financial condition in these countries.

These concerns are not new for people who have worked in international development. There has always been a struggle between economic development aspirations and sustainable environmental and social goals, which has to be sorted out by domestic debate and consultation. An interesting question is, what are the unique factors that have made BRI attract so much attention? What are the determining factors that have contributed to the success/failure of BRI projects? What are the lessons that can be learned?

To answer these questions, in 2017 and 2018, our research task force selected four countries, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Kenya, as case studies to investigate infrastructure construction by Chinese state-owned firms, with a focus on railway construction: the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail in Indonesia, the Addis Ababa-Djibouti electrified railway in Ethiopia, the Mombasa-Nairobi standard gauge railway in Kenya and the proposed railway project in Cambodia. The different types of railways represent both completed and stalled infrastructure projects within the BRI framework.

In 2015, the government of Indonesia accepted a Chinese bid over a Japanese bid for a 150-km high-speed rail connecting Jakarta and Bandung. The rail is Indonesia’s and Southeast Asia’s first high-speed rail project. However, the project has been plagued by problems since its inception, including questionable benefits, lack of proper environmental impact studies and consistency with spatial plans in Indonesia.

Another case is Cambodia, whose infrastructure is amongst the least developed in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region. In 2016, China and Cambodia issued a joint statement, proposing to accelerate the development of new Silk Road and invest in the construction of transportation, energy, agriculture and water management infrastructure in Cambodia.

In 2011, Export-Import Bank of China and China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation (CCECC) signed a $4 billion contract for the construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and the project was inaugurated in 2016.The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway is the first multinational electrified railway built and operated by China in Africa.

In 2014, China and Kenya signed an agreement in Nairobi agreeing to fund the construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway. A financial agreement was reached with a total investment of $3.8 billion, 90 percent of which was provided by China Eximbank and 10 percent by Kenyan financial funds. The railway began commercial operation in 2018. Both the African projects adopted "China standards, China technology, China equipment, China operation" for construction.

In analyzing why railway projects in Ethiopia and Kenya were completed smoothly, while facing obstacles in Indonesia and slow negotiations in Cambodia, we found that although all construction was completed or proposed to be completed by China, the extent to which governments have promoted the implementation of BRI projects is significantly linked to their own national interests and development priorities, as well as economic ties with China. Politics has also shaped the way how the public, particularly the governing elites in the country, perceive China’s BRI.

China has a long history of engaging with Africa dating back to 1950s. Since 2000, China's increasing investment in Africa enabled Chinese firms to accumulate experience in engineering construction as well as for the government to accumulate experience in working with African governments. There is mutual political trust between China and Ethiopia and Kenya. China's advanced construction technology and lower costs have greatly contributed to Africa’s needs for infrastructure development as these countries grow their industrial economies. China provides a financing model that combines aid and loans for infrastructure construction in Africa, which closes the funding gap for the African government.

In comparison to Ethiopia and Kenya, the implementation of China’s BRI in Indonesia and Cambodia appears inhibited by political and social challenges. In Indonesia, high-speed railway projects are progressing slowly. This has much to do with the development stage and geopolitical issues of Southeast Asia’s economy. Indonesia has relatively higher-level demand for economic development, requiring high-technology infrastructure rather than basic transportation needs. The high-speed rail construction in Indonesia is therefore an example of changing infrastructure demands as countries reach higher levels of economic development. In contrast, Cambodia’s economic growth lags behind neighboring countries, especially in rural areas. Prioritizing road development and electricity over railways will likely serve a greater portion of the population. As a result, although infrastructure is a top priority for the government of Cambodia, the railway project is still under negotiation between China and Cambodia.

China’s BRI has been framed as "China’s Marshall Plan", a form of "global expansion", or "neo-colonialism” by some Western analysts. We argue that the BRI could serve as a platform for China to transfer its successful development practices that have been tested in China’s own development experience since the early 1980s. After transforming China with high-speed rail lines, roads and electricity grids, Chinese firms are ready to export their expertise.

While the short-term focus of the BRI is mainly on infrastructure construction, the long-term implications could extend to other sectors. The whole idea of the BRI is not only about building a transport route between China and the participating countries, but also a trade and investment corridor which could generate the goods and services to be transported along the routes.

In view of lessons learned from our case studies, a successful BRI project largely depends on people’s trust and support in recipient countries. A BRI project can only be accepted and recognized, when not only the country can benefit from BRI projects, but also the major stakeholders in the country can also perceive and gain the benefits. The Chinese government needs to formulate and implement effective policies to promote better understanding between Chinese society and other societies in recipient countries to establish political trust not only at the level of governments, but also at the people's level. There is a need to connect hearts between people in China and these countries before connecting roads in these countries.

Xue Lan is dean of Schwarzman College and professor at School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University. Weng Lingfei is a senior research fellow at School of Public Affairs, Chongqing University.

This commentary is based on a research that was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (No. 17CGJ007) and received assistance from Jeffrey Sayer, Rebecca Riggs, James Langston, Jun Zheng, Hari Sutanto, Lim Chhunleang and Dilamo Otore.

The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

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