The need for mutual cultural understanding
By Douwe van den Oever |
chinawatch.cn |
Updated: 2019-03-25 15:38
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often portrayed in the West as “the largest infrastructure project in human history”, and is perceived as being a mainly Chinese commercial governmental project. As such, it is viewed as a tightly coordinated and carefully, centrally planned fleet of projects covering more than 100 countries, impacting more than 60 percent of mankind, and which involves massive capital outlays. It is generally seen as simply being a vastly ambitious large-scale infrastructure project, as well as a development program in order to distribute excess Chinese production capacity. This view is only partly correct, but insufficient for the understanding of some other important, if not essential, aspects of the Belt & Road Initiative, which, if not perceived, might hamper the implementation process of the initiative, and might limit its potential to bring development, stability, and thus, ultimately, peace to the regions it impacts.
For this understanding, two major cultural dimensions need to be explored: the Chinese and Western worldviews and the nature of Chinese and Western strategic thinking.
China and Europe hold different worldviews.
To understand how China’s worldview came into being, we first need to get a grasp of China’s geographical constraints and its history.
Geographically, China is totally landlocked by sea, mountains, and deserts. In ancient times, the steppes in the North were home to the Huns, incessantly invading Chinese territory, hence the building of the Great Wall, and thus yet another hard barrier, albeit a manmade one.
Because of these formidable, mostly natural barriers, virtually all of China’s history has played itself out within that constrained space, and this for a period of several millennia. There was little contact with the outside world, except for two invasions in the 13th and 17th centuries, the first being by the northern Mongols, who founded the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), and the second by the northeastern Manchus, who founded the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Both dynasties became quintessential Chinese dynasties. Even the illustrious ancient Silk Road ran through just a few narrow trade corridors.
Today, 1.3 billion Chinese mostly live in the same habitable space as their ancestors of the Han Dynasty, 2,000 years ago, with, then, a population of 60 million inhabitants, roughly the population of today’s France.
So, as China was and is an immovable country, early on, it evolved to see the world composed of itself and a number of partner states.The partner states were almost the only trusted trading partners for China, and no religion was imposed, nor was the local political system influenced, but stability and peace were the core priorities, as they continue to be today.
Western civilization, on the other hand, was not limited by such natural barriers, and has therefore developed a migrant culture not bound to a single location. It emerged in the Middle East, then moved to Egypt, Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, the Roman Empire, Northern Europe, and, only a few centuries ago, to America.
China and Europe also have different strategic understandings. Western media usually portray the BRI as an integrated and monolithic project, veiled in secrecy, because no explicit planning has been made available to the West, and have expressed doubts as to its ultimate feasibility.
But is the Belt and Road Initiative actually a project, as we apprehend it in the West?
If we dive into the Chinese strategic worldview, it is useful to look at China’s own economic reform process, which was launched 40 years ago. At the time, China was an extraordinarily poor country, devoid of virtually any capitalist or industrial experience. When Deng Xiaoping became China’s leader in 1978, it was decided that China would embark on the road to modernization and industrialization. When asked how to implement the planned economic reforms, Deng simply answered: “we will cross the river by feeling the stones”, this in order to describe the uncertain path ahead.
Formal planning of that vast reform process was formalized only as from 1992, a full 14 years into the implementation of the reforms. In comparison, the vast Belt and Road Initiative was launched only six years ago.
Such an approach to strategy is a quintessential Chinese one. General strategic direction prevails over detailed planning, as many of the roadblocks and opportunities on the path ahead cannot be known in advance. Such a strategic direction only provides a framework in which individual projects and initiatives are embedded. The implementation aspects of such a strategic directive are worked out as they emerge along the course of the process. This is the very reason why the English term used for the BRI is “initiative”.
When the Belt and Road Initiative is seen from this perspective, it becomes an organizing principle and a directional driving force for infrastructure development in the regions the initiative covers, rather than a centrally coordinated project with a detailed project planning.
On the other side of the spectrum, the Western approach to strategy is much more systematic, normative and explicit, which can lead to great and completely avoidable misunderstandings between China and the West. In cooperation, Western thinking expects transparent planning and monitoring, which, by construction, is anathema to such a vast initiative as the BRI, driven by a Chinese strategic framework-driven mindset.
In the arts, cultural exchanges and mutual understanding between the West, especially between Europe and China enjoy a long, and shared history.
However, as the BRI will increasingly be institutionalized across the Eurasian continent, it needs a different, and very specific form of mutual cultural understanding, and this includes a mutual understanding of each other’s worldviews and the different approaches to strategy and implementation.
Bridging the gap, or initiative-specific cultural differences, in a very systematic way, be they from a worldview perspective, or from a perspective of strategic understanding, are essential for successful cooperation, and therefore for a smooth building of a bridge of stability and peace across Eurasia.
Douwe van den Oever is a sinologist based in Switzerland.
The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.
All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often portrayed in the West as “the largest infrastructure project in human history”, and is perceived as being a mainly Chinese commercial governmental project. As such, it is viewed as a tightly coordinated and carefully, centrally planned fleet of projects covering more than 100 countries, impacting more than 60 percent of mankind, and which involves massive capital outlays. It is generally seen as simply being a vastly ambitious large-scale infrastructure project, as well as a development program in order to distribute excess Chinese production capacity. This view is only partly correct, but insufficient for the understanding of some other important, if not essential, aspects of the Belt & Road Initiative, which, if not perceived, might hamper the implementation process of the initiative, and might limit its potential to bring development, stability, and thus, ultimately, peace to the regions it impacts.
For this understanding, two major cultural dimensions need to be explored: the Chinese and Western worldviews and the nature of Chinese and Western strategic thinking.
China and Europe hold different worldviews.
To understand how China’s worldview came into being, we first need to get a grasp of China’s geographical constraints and its history.
Geographically, China is totally landlocked by sea, mountains, and deserts. In ancient times, the steppes in the North were home to the Huns, incessantly invading Chinese territory, hence the building of the Great Wall, and thus yet another hard barrier, albeit a manmade one.
Because of these formidable, mostly natural barriers, virtually all of China’s history has played itself out within that constrained space, and this for a period of several millennia. There was little contact with the outside world, except for two invasions in the 13th and 17th centuries, the first being by the northern Mongols, who founded the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), and the second by the northeastern Manchus, who founded the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Both dynasties became quintessential Chinese dynasties. Even the illustrious ancient Silk Road ran through just a few narrow trade corridors.
Today, 1.3 billion Chinese mostly live in the same habitable space as their ancestors of the Han Dynasty, 2,000 years ago, with, then, a population of 60 million inhabitants, roughly the population of today’s France.
So, as China was and is an immovable country, early on, it evolved to see the world composed of itself and a number of partner states.The partner states were almost the only trusted trading partners for China, and no religion was imposed, nor was the local political system influenced, but stability and peace were the core priorities, as they continue to be today.
Western civilization, on the other hand, was not limited by such natural barriers, and has therefore developed a migrant culture not bound to a single location. It emerged in the Middle East, then moved to Egypt, Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, the Roman Empire, Northern Europe, and, only a few centuries ago, to America.
China and Europe also have different strategic understandings. Western media usually portray the BRI as an integrated and monolithic project, veiled in secrecy, because no explicit planning has been made available to the West, and have expressed doubts as to its ultimate feasibility.
But is the Belt and Road Initiative actually a project, as we apprehend it in the West?
If we dive into the Chinese strategic worldview, it is useful to look at China’s own economic reform process, which was launched 40 years ago. At the time, China was an extraordinarily poor country, devoid of virtually any capitalist or industrial experience. When Deng Xiaoping became China’s leader in 1978, it was decided that China would embark on the road to modernization and industrialization. When asked how to implement the planned economic reforms, Deng simply answered: “we will cross the river by feeling the stones”, this in order to describe the uncertain path ahead.
Formal planning of that vast reform process was formalized only as from 1992, a full 14 years into the implementation of the reforms. In comparison, the vast Belt and Road Initiative was launched only six years ago.
Such an approach to strategy is a quintessential Chinese one. General strategic direction prevails over detailed planning, as many of the roadblocks and opportunities on the path ahead cannot be known in advance. Such a strategic direction only provides a framework in which individual projects and initiatives are embedded. The implementation aspects of such a strategic directive are worked out as they emerge along the course of the process. This is the very reason why the English term used for the BRI is “initiative”.
When the Belt and Road Initiative is seen from this perspective, it becomes an organizing principle and a directional driving force for infrastructure development in the regions the initiative covers, rather than a centrally coordinated project with a detailed project planning.
On the other side of the spectrum, the Western approach to strategy is much more systematic, normative and explicit, which can lead to great and completely avoidable misunderstandings between China and the West. In cooperation, Western thinking expects transparent planning and monitoring, which, by construction, is anathema to such a vast initiative as the BRI, driven by a Chinese strategic framework-driven mindset.
In the arts, cultural exchanges and mutual understanding between the West, especially between Europe and China enjoy a long, and shared history.
However, as the BRI will increasingly be institutionalized across the Eurasian continent, it needs a different, and very specific form of mutual cultural understanding, and this includes a mutual understanding of each other’s worldviews and the different approaches to strategy and implementation.
Bridging the gap, or initiative-specific cultural differences, in a very systematic way, be they from a worldview perspective, or from a perspective of strategic understanding, are essential for successful cooperation, and therefore for a smooth building of a bridge of stability and peace across Eurasia.
Douwe van den Oever is a sinologist based in Switzerland.
The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.
All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.
