US the weak link in 5G security
By Li Zheng |
chinawatch.cn |
Updated: 2019-05-30 15:45
The Prague 5G Security Conference was held on May 2 to 3 in the Czech Republic, attended by delegations from over 30 countries (the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and all the European Union's 28 member states) as well as NATO and four global mobile communications network organizations. The aim of this event was to push for international cooperation on 5G security. A nonbinding document titled the Prague Proposals was signed with the aim of promoting 5G rules in line with Western interests.
The White House highly acclaimed this meeting in a statement issued shortly afterward and maintained that the US government would take the Prague Proposals as its guideline for action. The US support for the meeting and the document come as no surprise since the exclusive club taking shape in Prague is what the US has advocated for and most of the content in the Proposals is highly consistent with US 5G security principles. In fact, the US played the leading role at the meeting with the rest 30-plus countries being merely supporting actors.
But its practice of building an inclusive club goes far away from the original intention of enhancing international cooperation on 5G, so this meeting will have no positive influence on 5G security.
Judging from appearances, the meeting steered the current 5G international cooperation in a trajectory that is favorable to the US and helped it eliminate some of the competitors, represented by Chinese communications companies like Huawei and ZTE. The Proposals stipulate that when governments build 5G networks, they should take into account the model of governance, the government's influence and possible cyber threats of the country from which the third party supplier comes. Though the clauses do not mention any country or company by name, the US has turned a deaf ear to facts and listed Chinese companies as "influenced by governments".
The US had been lobbying its European and Asia-Pacific allies from using Chinese companies' equipment in their 5G networks prior to this meeting, but in vain. The US sent huge delegations to the Munich Security Conference and Barcelona World Mobile Congress in February with the objective of publicizing the "security risk" brought about by Chinese companies participating in 5G networks. However, these lobbying activities did not get an endorsement from related countries or industries. Not long after, the United Kingdom and Germany both released signals they would allow Chinese companies to participate in their 5G networks. The US now cherishes the hope that the Prague Proposals will prompt Western countries to force out Chinese 5G products.
But seen from some details, this conference is not a complete US triumph. It was a long way from producing a consensus among Western countries on the US-advocated 5G security rules. To start with, the Proposals avoid mentioning any specific country by name, instead they adopt softer expressions in some sensitive clauses. And the US gave the only official statement on the Proposals. This indicates that the other participating countries still harbor reservations about the content of the Proposals and do not want to give the impression that they have already joined the exclusive US-dominated 5G club. Considering the strategic and overall significance of 5G technologies, these countries still commit themselves to 5G security principles that are grounded in their own national interests and development demands.
In addition, the countries and organizations participating are not representative. Both the US and the Czech Republic hoped to attract as many countries as possible in order to exert more external pressure on China, but it turned out that all participating countries are the traditional Western ones, with most of them having security alliances with the US. They do not represent the mainstream understanding of 5G in the international community, nor can they guarantee that their security standards will suit the actual conditions of developing countries. Due to the lack of participation of non-Western countries, it's unlikely the Proposals will become a fundamental document for global 5G security cooperation.
Moreover, the suggestions of the Proposals are far from feasible. 5G security issues will eventually have to be solved by technological advances of equipment suppliers. Only when they come up with creative and reliable solutions will the security of 5G networks and equipment be safeguarded. This security approach dominated by industries and technology experts represents the mainstream model of the internet economy, for it not only ensures the rapid development and application of advanced technologies, but also eliminates huge and systematic risks. The industrial and technological communities can get faster and better understanding of the risks brought about by new technologies, which enables them to take quicker and more effective measures than governments. But the basic logic in the Prague Proposals contradicts this approach because of the Proposals' emphasis on governments' role and their intervention to restrict market access and the Proposals' lack of technical rules. If the US was to take this document as the guide for 5G international cooperation, this mistaken guide may lead cooperation along the wrong path.
Past experience shows that the success of the internet lies in open technologies, unified standards and the absence of political intervention. These three factors have lowered the costs of technology R&D, product application and overseas market development. Therefore, some companies have managed to expand and grow, and new industrial chains and new division of labor took shape. 5G technologies are regarded as the main technology platform for next-generation internet technologies. If exclusive clubs full of suspicion form, 5G technologies will not grow and develop as quickly and smoothly as the internet did. Such a slowdown would have a negative impact on the information industries of all countries. The US, as a pacesetter for global communications industry, will suffer the most. Such clubs will also divide the energy and resources that are invested in 5G, which may make this technology more vulnerable to hackers, criminal organizations and terrorists. These groups will be the major threats to 5G security, but they were not even discussed at the Prague meeting.
The author is an associate research fellow at the Institute of American Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.
All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.
The Prague 5G Security Conference was held on May 2 to 3 in the Czech Republic, attended by delegations from over 30 countries (the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and all the European Union's 28 member states) as well as NATO and four global mobile communications network organizations. The aim of this event was to push for international cooperation on 5G security. A nonbinding document titled the Prague Proposals was signed with the aim of promoting 5G rules in line with Western interests.
The White House highly acclaimed this meeting in a statement issued shortly afterward and maintained that the US government would take the Prague Proposals as its guideline for action. The US support for the meeting and the document come as no surprise since the exclusive club taking shape in Prague is what the US has advocated for and most of the content in the Proposals is highly consistent with US 5G security principles. In fact, the US played the leading role at the meeting with the rest 30-plus countries being merely supporting actors.
But its practice of building an inclusive club goes far away from the original intention of enhancing international cooperation on 5G, so this meeting will have no positive influence on 5G security.
Judging from appearances, the meeting steered the current 5G international cooperation in a trajectory that is favorable to the US and helped it eliminate some of the competitors, represented by Chinese communications companies like Huawei and ZTE. The Proposals stipulate that when governments build 5G networks, they should take into account the model of governance, the government's influence and possible cyber threats of the country from which the third party supplier comes. Though the clauses do not mention any country or company by name, the US has turned a deaf ear to facts and listed Chinese companies as "influenced by governments".
The US had been lobbying its European and Asia-Pacific allies from using Chinese companies' equipment in their 5G networks prior to this meeting, but in vain. The US sent huge delegations to the Munich Security Conference and Barcelona World Mobile Congress in February with the objective of publicizing the "security risk" brought about by Chinese companies participating in 5G networks. However, these lobbying activities did not get an endorsement from related countries or industries. Not long after, the United Kingdom and Germany both released signals they would allow Chinese companies to participate in their 5G networks. The US now cherishes the hope that the Prague Proposals will prompt Western countries to force out Chinese 5G products.
But seen from some details, this conference is not a complete US triumph. It was a long way from producing a consensus among Western countries on the US-advocated 5G security rules. To start with, the Proposals avoid mentioning any specific country by name, instead they adopt softer expressions in some sensitive clauses. And the US gave the only official statement on the Proposals. This indicates that the other participating countries still harbor reservations about the content of the Proposals and do not want to give the impression that they have already joined the exclusive US-dominated 5G club. Considering the strategic and overall significance of 5G technologies, these countries still commit themselves to 5G security principles that are grounded in their own national interests and development demands.
In addition, the countries and organizations participating are not representative. Both the US and the Czech Republic hoped to attract as many countries as possible in order to exert more external pressure on China, but it turned out that all participating countries are the traditional Western ones, with most of them having security alliances with the US. They do not represent the mainstream understanding of 5G in the international community, nor can they guarantee that their security standards will suit the actual conditions of developing countries. Due to the lack of participation of non-Western countries, it's unlikely the Proposals will become a fundamental document for global 5G security cooperation.
Moreover, the suggestions of the Proposals are far from feasible. 5G security issues will eventually have to be solved by technological advances of equipment suppliers. Only when they come up with creative and reliable solutions will the security of 5G networks and equipment be safeguarded. This security approach dominated by industries and technology experts represents the mainstream model of the internet economy, for it not only ensures the rapid development and application of advanced technologies, but also eliminates huge and systematic risks. The industrial and technological communities can get faster and better understanding of the risks brought about by new technologies, which enables them to take quicker and more effective measures than governments. But the basic logic in the Prague Proposals contradicts this approach because of the Proposals' emphasis on governments' role and their intervention to restrict market access and the Proposals' lack of technical rules. If the US was to take this document as the guide for 5G international cooperation, this mistaken guide may lead cooperation along the wrong path.
Past experience shows that the success of the internet lies in open technologies, unified standards and the absence of political intervention. These three factors have lowered the costs of technology R&D, product application and overseas market development. Therefore, some companies have managed to expand and grow, and new industrial chains and new division of labor took shape. 5G technologies are regarded as the main technology platform for next-generation internet technologies. If exclusive clubs full of suspicion form, 5G technologies will not grow and develop as quickly and smoothly as the internet did. Such a slowdown would have a negative impact on the information industries of all countries. The US, as a pacesetter for global communications industry, will suffer the most. Such clubs will also divide the energy and resources that are invested in 5G, which may make this technology more vulnerable to hackers, criminal organizations and terrorists. These groups will be the major threats to 5G security, but they were not even discussed at the Prague meeting.
The author is an associate research fellow at the Institute of American Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.
The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.
All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.