G20
China, Japan need to grasp opportunities
By Yang Bojiang | chinawatch.cn | Updated: 2019-06-18 17:06

In 2012, Japan announced its plan to nationalize the Diaoyu Islands, provoking China's wrath and plunging Sino-Japanese relations to an all-time low. The next year witnessed some of darkest moments of the relationship since the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972. In April 2013 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo claimed in the Upper House that the definition of “aggression” has yet to be established either among academics or by the international community, and in December he officially paid homage to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors among others 14 Class-A war criminals.

In November 2014, at the APEC Leaders Summit in Beijing, the leaders of both countries had a brief meeting. Several days prior, the two countries reached a four-point consensus on improving China-Japan ties, a gesture that both were willing to work on improving relations.

In 2017, the Japanese government sent delegates to attend China’s first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. In 2018, Premier Li Keqiang visited Japan and Prime Minister Abe visited China, signifying that bilateral relations eventually returned to the right track.

Regarding the twists and turns, the improvement is driven by common interests and policies. The biggest driving force is the two nations’ innate, constant demands of social and economic development.

External factors, especially the US, are not the primary driving force in the improvement of relations. In last few years, in particular, the China-US trade friction has escalated and as have Japan-US conflicts. Japan and the US have different views on trade, trading mechanisms, the security of Northeast Asia and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and even about America’s arms sales policies.

Another noteworthy factor is the growing clout of China and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. The region, after the Cold War, used to be primarily dominated by the US. However, the dynamics have changed recently, thanks to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, Japan has become more visible and more vocal in the Asia-Pacific community, despite lackluster economic growth. It has readjusted its national security strategy and defense policies to increase its international profile. It has actively engaged in the CPTPP (Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership) talks and signed the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the trade agreementto create the largest free-trade zone in the world.

However, a better Sino-Japanese relationship hinges on the efforts, strategies and policies of both sides.

First, both side should be clearly aware that the potential for bilateral cooperation lies in the complementary strengths of the two countries. As early as in the 1960s, Masataka Kousaka, a renowned Japanese scholar of international politics, pointed out that China should not be viewed as an archenemy of Japan. Kenichi Ohmae, another prestigious scholar of management in modern times, also recommended Japan treating China as a “patron” in the 21st century, as the Chinese market would be big for Japanese goods. Meanwhile, China wants Japanese know-how in energy conservation and environmental protection, and experience in social governance, regional cooperation and even in surviving a trade war.

Second, for smooth and sustainable relations, both countries need to handle disputes properly, especially the remaining sensitive issues that cannot be addressed in the near future. The first step in solving any problem is recognizing there is one. Acknowledging the thorny issues including the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands can help manage the tension or even create conditions for a mutually-acceptable solution in the future. We have to face the problems heads-on, not bury our heads in the sand.

Third, both sides should enhance dialogue and expand the scope of communication. China and Japan have shared goals in promoting free trade zones and regional cooperation, but they also have disputes or even conflicts with each other. A more assertive Japan does not necessarily see eye to eye with a rising China. For instance, as the host of this year’s G20 summit, Japan’s stance on WTO reforms, e-business and cyber security transparency, are aligned more with the Western world than China.

To increase the stability and sustainability of China-Japan relations, we should deal with the old burdens of the past properly and seek more common interests. Specifically, both countries need to face reality squarely, properly handle disputes and move solutions forward. Both need to see bilateral relations in a bigger context, "when the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century”.

At such a historical juncture, China needs to understand Japan better, and vice versa. For instance, the experience of Japan in managing to keep the Gini coefficient, an index of income inequality, low. The Heisei Era has just concluded, but Chinese scholars do not have sufficient knowledge about the mainstream social and political trends during the Heisei Era or post-war Japan at large.

The expectation for a closer relationship will be reduced to wishful thinking if not backed up by real projects and initiatives. It is imperative to reinforce concrete collaboration. For instance, pressing ahead projects in third markets will help both sides to overcome the cultural gap.

China is keen on promoting new international relations and a community of shared destiny for mankind, while Japan has set its sight on exploring a new development path in the Reiwa Era. It is the goal of both nations to seize the historical opportunities, safeguard peace and stability, and work together to tackle the challenges ahead.

Yang Bojiang is director of the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

This article was translated by Hou Sheng.

The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.

In 2012, Japan announced its plan to nationalize the Diaoyu Islands, provoking China's wrath and plunging Sino-Japanese relations to an all-time low. The next year witnessed some of darkest moments of the relationship since the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972. In April 2013 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo claimed in the Upper House that the definition of “aggression” has yet to be established either among academics or by the international community, and in December he officially paid homage to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors among others 14 Class-A war criminals.

In November 2014, at the APEC Leaders Summit in Beijing, the leaders of both countries had a brief meeting. Several days prior, the two countries reached a four-point consensus on improving China-Japan ties, a gesture that both were willing to work on improving relations.

In 2017, the Japanese government sent delegates to attend China’s first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. In 2018, Premier Li Keqiang visited Japan and Prime Minister Abe visited China, signifying that bilateral relations eventually returned to the right track.

Regarding the twists and turns, the improvement is driven by common interests and policies. The biggest driving force is the two nations’ innate, constant demands of social and economic development.

External factors, especially the US, are not the primary driving force in the improvement of relations. In last few years, in particular, the China-US trade friction has escalated and as have Japan-US conflicts. Japan and the US have different views on trade, trading mechanisms, the security of Northeast Asia and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and even about America’s arms sales policies.

Another noteworthy factor is the growing clout of China and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. The region, after the Cold War, used to be primarily dominated by the US. However, the dynamics have changed recently, thanks to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, Japan has become more visible and more vocal in the Asia-Pacific community, despite lackluster economic growth. It has readjusted its national security strategy and defense policies to increase its international profile. It has actively engaged in the CPTPP (Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership) talks and signed the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the trade agreementto create the largest free-trade zone in the world.

However, a better Sino-Japanese relationship hinges on the efforts, strategies and policies of both sides.

First, both side should be clearly aware that the potential for bilateral cooperation lies in the complementary strengths of the two countries. As early as in the 1960s, Masataka Kousaka, a renowned Japanese scholar of international politics, pointed out that China should not be viewed as an archenemy of Japan. Kenichi Ohmae, another prestigious scholar of management in modern times, also recommended Japan treating China as a “patron” in the 21st century, as the Chinese market would be big for Japanese goods. Meanwhile, China wants Japanese know-how in energy conservation and environmental protection, and experience in social governance, regional cooperation and even in surviving a trade war.

Second, for smooth and sustainable relations, both countries need to handle disputes properly, especially the remaining sensitive issues that cannot be addressed in the near future. The first step in solving any problem is recognizing there is one. Acknowledging the thorny issues including the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands can help manage the tension or even create conditions for a mutually-acceptable solution in the future. We have to face the problems heads-on, not bury our heads in the sand.

Third, both sides should enhance dialogue and expand the scope of communication. China and Japan have shared goals in promoting free trade zones and regional cooperation, but they also have disputes or even conflicts with each other. A more assertive Japan does not necessarily see eye to eye with a rising China. For instance, as the host of this year’s G20 summit, Japan’s stance on WTO reforms, e-business and cyber security transparency, are aligned more with the Western world than China.

To increase the stability and sustainability of China-Japan relations, we should deal with the old burdens of the past properly and seek more common interests. Specifically, both countries need to face reality squarely, properly handle disputes and move solutions forward. Both need to see bilateral relations in a bigger context, "when the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century”.

At such a historical juncture, China needs to understand Japan better, and vice versa. For instance, the experience of Japan in managing to keep the Gini coefficient, an index of income inequality, low. The Heisei Era has just concluded, but Chinese scholars do not have sufficient knowledge about the mainstream social and political trends during the Heisei Era or post-war Japan at large.

The expectation for a closer relationship will be reduced to wishful thinking if not backed up by real projects and initiatives. It is imperative to reinforce concrete collaboration. For instance, pressing ahead projects in third markets will help both sides to overcome the cultural gap.

China is keen on promoting new international relations and a community of shared destiny for mankind, while Japan has set its sight on exploring a new development path in the Reiwa Era. It is the goal of both nations to seize the historical opportunities, safeguard peace and stability, and work together to tackle the challenges ahead.

Yang Bojiang is director of the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

This article was translated by Hou Sheng.

The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

All rights reserved. Copying or sharing of any content for other than personal use is prohibited without prior written permission.