With regard to the current frictions between China and the United States, some experts have recently expressed concerns over a possible decoupling in the realm of technology and even a new "Cold War". Since innovation in science and technology is the major source of national growth in this digital age, it is inevitable that the US should try to contain China's capacity in this field with selective measures. To prevent China from outsmarting the US in technological innovation, Washington has enacted policies to roll back exchanges in the technology sector with China, including limiting the number of Chinese students studying advanced technology in the US. And the US is likely to continue to lock Huawei out of its market as a basic policy stance; at best, it may fine-tune some of its policies to reduce the costs entailed in barring Huawei from the 5G market.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that another "Cold War" is inevitable. The Cold War refers to a special historical period in which two superpowers engaged in a strategic competition to expand their ideologies through proxy wars. Unless China and the US engage in proxy wars to expand the sphere of their ideological influence, we will not find ourselves mired in another cold war even if the two giants become partially decoupled in the realm of science and technology.

In The Inertia of History published in 2013, I predicted the bipolarization of the international relations landscape. Such a trend has been witnessed over the last six years and can be illustrated by two facts. One is the reduced power gap between the US and China as they simultaneously enlarged the power gap between themselves and other major powers. Together, the aggregate GDP of China and the US accounts for 40 percent of global output, and the share is expected to rise in the coming years. The other fact is that the competition between China and the US is the main theme of their bilateral ties. So, medium-sized and smaller countries will face growing pressures to take sides in the China-US tussle, such as in the current issue of whether to use Huawei's 5G technology or agree to the US demands to boycott it.

By 2023, or five years from now, I believe China-US relations will be even worse than they are now, with competition even more intensified. An optimistic scenario for a decade from now would be to have our bilateral relations return to where they were in 2018. But in 10 years, even though the international order may avoid direct wars between major powers, we may see growing violations of international norms. As global governance stalls and multilateralism is hamstrung, bilateral diplomacy may become the main avenue for achieving meaningful results.

Unlike in the past, major powers now mainly compete in cyberspace, which differs from traditional geopolitical rivalry, namely the natural geographical environment has less of a role in international politics. And cyberspace has two distinguishing features.

First, the main source of wealth in cyberspace is data, which increases along with usage, the opposite of natural resources, which eventually run dry through use. And second, cyberspace is practically free from the constraints of the geographical environment, and they do not affect the cooperation or confrontation carried out there.

In light of these differences, the core competitiveness of a major power lies not in its ability to possess or control natural resources but rather in its capacity to make use of data. Therefore, a technological edge is more powerful than an advantage in any other area. And as technological progress comes from unleashing the innovative power of individuals, a country whose government can maximize its people's capacity for technological innovation is one with higher chances to prevail in competition.

As highly innovative individuals are spread throughout the world, a country which can create the most favorable conditions to attract innovative talent from around the world to serve its own needs is more likely to beat its competitors. An example of putting this principle into practice is Huawei's worldwide search for top professionals in science and technology.

Mid-sized and smaller countries, on the other hand, tend to adopt a hedging strategy instead of relying completely on China or the US, as they have learned from their experience in the Cold War. This hedging strategy is about choosing sides on an issue-specific basis; a mid-sized or small country chooses which country to side with based on their interests on a specific issue.

The next decade is likely to see international conflicts to continue unabated. But in order to minimize the impact of these conflicts, we need a comprehensive plan with three urgent actions. First, we have to actively avoid getting involved in ideological competition. So, we must constrain current conflicts within their domains and avoid getting swept up in ideological strife. Second, we must strive for implementation of the government's opening-up policy. As reform and opening-up was the fundamental principle that enabled our success in the past 40 years, we should be even more active in going abroad and welcoming foreign businesses to come. Third, more favorable policies are needed to attract innovative talent from around the world and enable them to make contributions to the development of science and technology in China.

The author is a distinguished professor at Tsinghua University.

The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

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