The historic signing of the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement(AfCFTA) on March 21,2018, marked a momentous milestone for regional integration in Africa. A few weeks ago, in Niamey,the capital of Niger, Nigeria and Benin signed the AfCFTA, bringing the number of countries that have committed to the agreement 54 out of 55, Eritrea being the only country yet to commit.

The AfCFTA came into force in May after 24 countries ratified the agreement. The agreement covers an area more than four times the size of the European Union, thus creating a single market of 1.2 billion people by removing existing trade barriers across African countries' borders.

A lot of existing intra-African trade takes place within established economic blocs and customs unions. Currently, there are eight regional economic communities,namely the Southern African Development Community(SADC); Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States(CEMAC); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States(CEN-SAD); Intergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union(AMU).

Therefore, opening the continent into one single market is a huge milestone. It is estimated that if the current bilateral tariffs among African countries were to be eliminated, intra-Africa trade would increase by up to 52 percent.

Also, if the continent removes non-tariff barriers with countries outside Africa it could increase trade and boost the continent's tariff revenues by up to$15 billion.

All the above could and should be seen as good news and make any well-wisher of Africa's socioeconomic development feel optimistic.However, deep reflection on Africa's past and current efforts at regional development will make one either cautiously optimistic, or else pessimistic, as the road to realization of this dream is still a very long and a bumpy one. A few examples will illustrate this.

First and foremost, the full commitment of African leaders to addressing either regional or continental challenges has either been missing or wavering.

In most cases, they have been talking as if they were together as a region, but when it comes to implementation a country's interests are given first priority.

This type of attitude makes countries compete against each other. It is no wonder therefore that most of the trans-country initiatives have either been partially implemented or the pace of implementation has been wanting, to the extent that, in spite of the huge number of RECS,intra-Africa trade remains low, relative to other continents.

Evidence shows that intra-African trade accounted for only a small share of Africa's total exports and imports during 2010-17 period. Indeed, the continent traded more with the outside world than internally, with the European Union taking the largest share of Africa's exports- an average of more than 30 percent.

Second, Africa has exploited less than 16 percent of intra-African trade potential, largely due to trade barriers and poor transport and telecommunication connectivity on the continent. In other words, non-tariff barriers are a big problem in Africa. Two examples will illustrate this. One, the failure by COMESAEAC-SADC member states to sign and ratify instruments for the creation of a tripartite free trade area four years after its launch, points to the reluctance of African countries to open up their markets.

Kenya's dairy industry, for example, has faced difficulty accessing the Zambian market, while the actual sell-by date of Kenyan tea has been a subject of controversy in Sudan because of different standards.

Third, most of the products traded within Africa's internal markets are still raw minerals or traditional commodities with little or no added value. Notwithstanding the fact that Africa has the largest number of young consumers in the world,this shows clearly that the continent is yet to undergo the structural transformation necessary for industrialization.

It is true that Africa, as a continent, as well as the RECs, has an industrialization agenda, but it will take a very long time before it is realized.

Fourth, infrastructure in Africa is a big problem. There are some networks, especially in southern Africa, but otherwise that there is no infrastructure. Without fixing this problem, achieving higher trade levels among African countries remains a great challenge.

Fifth, peace and security issues,leading to conflicts among member states of the RECs, have had negative impacts on trade. For example,currently there is a conflict between Uganda and Rwanda, which has resulted in the closure of the Gatuna border for more than three months. As a result, Uganda has lost more than $664 million's worth of exports.

Likewise, Rwanda has lost $104 million during the three months.The data excludes losses incurred by other service providers like transporters, health and education providers.

The closure has had spillover effect on other countries in the region. Although Kenya does not share a direct border with Rwanda,Kenyan exports passing through Uganda have also been locked out.

Sixth, in order to take full advantage of the AfCFTA, countries must buttress its implementation with complementary measures, such as concluding some pending protocols.

These include those on intellectual property, competition policy and investment policy, as well as addressing the issues of e-commerce and integration in a digitizing Africa. Reaching a consensus among the African leadership on these critical issues will not be easy.

Last, for many years the EU has been the main adviser of African RECs on regional integration issues. Indeed, the ongoing discussions on Brexit will, on the one hand, dampen Africa's appetite to forge ahead steadily with its regional integration agenda. On the other hand, it could provide African countries with valuable lessons on the imperative of improving their preparedness as far as integration issues are concerned.

In conclusion, the above challenges are a clear testimony to the fact that, there is a lot that needs to be done, before the promising future of the AfCFTA can become a reality.

The author is a professor of Economics and director of the Centre for Chinese Studies at University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The author contributed this article to China Watch exclusively. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Watch.

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